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Abstract
This paper argues that the increased wage inequality observed in recent years is driven by
changes in management compensation. The analysis is conducted within the framework of a two-
sector search model with heterogeneous employees and heterogenous jobs i.e. employees with
diﬀerent educational levels who work in either management or the non-management sector of
a ﬁrm. Individuals employed in the non-management sector search for management jobs while
employed. This model characterizes the labor market ﬂows, the ﬁrm’s structure and the employee
composition as well as the wage distribution in the ﬁrm. Using the personnel records from a large
pharmaceutical company, the parameters of the model are estimated. This allows us to conclude
that the increased wage inequality observed is due to ampliﬁed within and between group wage
inequality which is driven by an increased gap between management and non-management wages.
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21I n t r o d u c t i o n
In recent decades, the United States and other developed countries have experienced increased wage
inequality. This development is driven partly by a widening of the wage diﬀerentials between skilled
and unskilled workers with a particular rise in the relative earnings of college graduates and partly
by an increase in wage dispersion within narrowly deﬁned education-experience cells.1 The widening
in the wage distribution is especially pronounced in the period after the mid-1970s and accelerated
up through the 1980s. During the same period of time, management compensation is revolutionized.
Over the period 1970 to 1996, CEO cash compensation doubled and realized pay nearly quadrupled,
see Murphy (1999) and Hall and Murphy (2003). That the change in management compensation
may have real and sizeable consequences for wage inequality is implicitly shown by Autor, Katz and
Kearney (2005) who ﬁnd that: "fully 90 percent of the net increase in male 90-10 earnings inequality
between 1979 and 2003 is accounted for by the rise in the 90-50 wage gap". Thus the action in the
wage distribution is clearly in the upper tail. Motivated by these observations, this paper argues that
there is a close relation between the changes in management compensation and the development in
wage inequality. In particular, we show that an increased wage gap between non-management and
management employees can explain a signiﬁcant part of the increased inequality both between and
within educational groups.
The analysis of the wage distribution is conducted in a joint theoretical-empirical framework. The
theoretical model is used to characterize the wage distribution of a representative ﬁrm. Furthermore, it
provides a detailed decomposition of the wage distribution which can be used to identify the underlying
driving forces leading to increased wage dispersion. In the empirical analysis, point estimates of the
model’s parameters are obtained. Given the structure imposed by the model, the empirical results
reveal that the changes in the wage distribution is due to general and skill biased technological change.
Finally, the identiﬁed technology shocks are used to predict employment responses.
The theoretical model which is presented in the next section is a two-sector search model with
on-the-job search a la Pissarides (1994, 2000).2 In the model, both jobs and workers are heterogenous.
Workers are distinguished by their education level. Some workers have a basic education level and are
referred to as "low-skilled". Other workers have a higher level of education and are referred to as "high-
skilled". Both types of workers are employed in a ﬁrm with a non-management and a management
sector. In our setup and analysis we follow an approach similar to McKenna (1996), Albrecht and
Vroman (2002) and Gautier (2002). But contrary to these authors, we do not restrict the job search
of low-skilled individuals.
The theoretical model provides a complete description of the employee ﬂows related to a represen-
tative ﬁrm such as transitions from the external labor market and into the ﬁrm (hirings), reallocations
within the ﬁrm (promotions) and separations. These ﬂows fully identify the size, structure and em-
1These ﬁndings are documented by Katz and Murphy (1992), Murphy and Welch (1992), Juhn et al (1993), Levy and
Murnane (1992), Bartel and Sicherman (1999), Katz and Autor (1999) and Autor, Katz and Kearney (2005).
2The job assignment model used by Bernhardt (1995), Gibbons and Waldman (1999) and Frederiksen and Takáts
(2005) provides an alternative to the search model applied in the present analysis. In contrast to the job assignment
model which is focused on the underlying selection and sorting processes and the individual’s wage formation, the present
analysis is more in line with the search literature which is focused on providing a complete treatment of worker ﬂows
and wage dispersion. See the discussions in Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) and Burdett and Mortensen (1998).
3ployee composition in the ﬁrm which is the ﬁrst component essential for the description of the wage
distribution. The second component is the relative wages of the diﬀerent employee subgroups. In the
model these wages are determined by the employees’ productivity and Nash bargaining.3 Thus, the
model provides a complete characterization of the wage distribution.
The model’s parameters are estimated using seven years of monthly personnel records (1997 to 2003)
from the main production site of an international pharmaceutical company. The advantage of these
data compared to traditional labor market data sets is the information about the employees’ allocation
to jobs within the ﬁrm, i.e. whether the worker is employed in management or non-management.4 This
allows for estimation of the wage diﬀerentials across various employee subgroups and for studying how
they develop over time.
Using the close link between wages and productivity established in the theoretical model, we can
conclude that technology shocks increase the productivity level in the ﬁrm over the period leading to an
overall real wage growth of 1.69 percent. Furthermore, the ﬁrm is hit by a series of skill-biased shocks
that alter the relative wages. In particular, it is established that the relative wages of management
employees have grown substantially over the period.
The main ﬁnding in the paper is that the increased wage inequality observed is due to ampliﬁed
within and between group wage inequality which is driven by an increased gap between management
and non-management wages. This follows from the observation that the overall return to education has
increased by 2 percent over the period 1997 to 2003, but the return to education in non-management has
increased by only 1.51 percent and the return to education in management decreased by 13.90 percent
in the same period. This indicates that the within-rank developments in the relative wages between
high- and low-skilled employees are unable to explain the overall increase in the return to education.
Instead, it is driven by a divergence of relative wages between management and non-management
employees.
Two key results follow from this observation. First, the higher between educational group wage
diﬀerential (the returns to education) is driven by changes in the wage diﬀerentials between non-
management and management. Second, a large part of the within educational group wage diﬀerential
is due to job assignment. This shows that changes in the internal labor market of the ﬁrm such
as relative wage dynamics and employee composition eﬀects play a prominent role in explaining the
recently observed changes in wage inequality.
Section 2 presents the theoretical model and provides a discussion of the eﬀects of technological
change on the wage structure. Section 3 presents the data and describes the changes in the ﬁrm’s wage
distribution. The empirical analysis is conducted in section 4. Section 5 examines the endogenous
employment responses that will follow the technology shocks which are identiﬁed in the empirical
analysis and study their eﬀects on the wage structure. Finally, section 6 summarizes and concludes.
3The empirical relevance of the bargaining model is established by Lazear and Oyer (2004a, b) who show that ﬁrm-
ﬁxed-eﬀects matter for wage determination.
4The use of employer-employee data has become widespread in recent years, see Abowd and Kramarz (1999). Few of
these data sets, however, contain information about the hierarchical level of the employees. An exception is the Swedish
data used by Lazear and Oyer (2004a, b).
42 The Model
Consider a (representative) ﬁrm facing a labor force of N workers. The workers employed by the
ﬁrm are members of the internal labor market denoted by I, the remaining individuals constitute the
external labor force, E. The size of the total labor force is normalized to unity, i.e. N = I + E =1 .
All workers are distinguished by an observable education attainment where the proportion π (π is
exogenously given) of the workers is low-skilled and the remaining 1 − π is high-skilled. High-skilled
workers will be referred to as H-workers while low-skilled workers will be referred to as L-workers.
The ﬁrm has two sectors: Management (M) and non-management (NM). The jobs in management
are heterogeneous as they have skill requirements. For instance, some management jobs in production
require detailed knowledge about the production process which is only possessed by craftsmen (low-
skilled). Supervisory administrative jobs, on the other hand, cannot be occupied by craftsmen as
they do not have the required skills. Instead, these jobs are productive only if they are ﬁlled with
high-skilled employees (accountants, lawyers etc.). For this reason, the model explicitly distinguishes
between management jobs that require high-skilled and low-skilled workers.5 The vacancies associated
with these jobs are referred to as H-vacancies and L-vacancies. The vacancies in non-management are
denoted as NM-vacancies and they can be occupied by a worker of any skill type as in Albrecht and
Vroman (2002) and Gautier (2002).
The output generated by L- and H- workers in non-management and management are yLj and
yHj, respectively, where j = NM,M. Two assumptions regarding the productivity of the diﬀerent
employee subgroups are imposed. First, high-skilled workers are more productive than low-skilled
workers because schooling gives the workers a higher production capacity.6 Thus it follows that yLj <
yHj,j= NM,M. Second, we assume like Rosen (1982) that workers in non-management jobs have
limited discretion over resources and hence are less productive than employees in management jobs
who control resources. This implies that yLNM <y HNM <y LM <y HM.
When the ﬁrm opens up a vacancy, the type is determined ex-ante. Thus, the potential employees
will take the restrictions on productivity and the skill requirements advertised with the job as given
when looking for a new job. This allows for the following description of the job search behavior, see
Figure (1). High-skilled individuals have the highest productivity in a management job, hence both
H-external (eH) and H-internal currently employed in a non-management job (iHNM) will be looking
for H-vacancies (vH) in the management sector. L-external (eL) and L-internal employed in the non-
management sector (iLNM) cannot get H-vacancies. So low-skilled workers are looking for vacancies
matching their type. As for the high-skilled workers, the productivity of L-workers is highest in the
management sector. This implies that both L-external and L-internal employed in the non-management
sector are looking for L-vacancies in the management sector (vL). The employees currently working in
management have no incentives to search for a new job. Thus only individuals in the external labor
market search for vacancies in the non-management sector (vNM).
5This corresponds to assuming that high- and low-skilled employees are imperfect substitutes in management. For a
detailed discussion of this assumption, see Freeman and Katz (1994).
6Gautier (2002) argues that high-skilled workers need not be more productive in all low-skilled jobs. However, he
agrees that some high-skilled workers are more productive at some unskilled jobs than unskilled workers. We simply
assume, in accordance with the data, that high-skilled workers are more productive than low-skilled workers in all types
of jobs considered in this analysis.
5Workers and vacancies meet each other randomly according to a matching function that is increasing
in its argument, concave and homogenous of degree 1.7 This implies that the matching process between
jobs and workers can be expressed as follows
xHM = xHM(vH,ηHeH + iHNM)=λ(vH)α(ηHeH + iHNM)1−α,
xLM = xLM(vL,ηLeL + iLNM)=λ(vL)α(ηLeL + iLNM)1−α,
xNM = xNM(vNM,e L + eH)=λ(vNM)α(eL + eH)1−α.
Where 0 ≤ ηH,ηL ≤ 1. The parameters ηH and ηL characterize the ﬁrm’s hiring strategy and reﬂects
that the ﬁrm may have preferences for incumbent employees when ﬁlling management vacancies. Nat-
urally, this reduces the external employee’s (relative to the internal employee’s) probability of getting
a job in management.
Tournament games provide a motivation for choosing η<1, see Lazear and Rosen (1981). If
the number of vacancies in management are ﬁxed ex-ante, it will create competition between the
employees having a desire for the jobs which has a direct eﬀect on the employee’s productivity i.e.
y(η). McLaughlin (1988) showed that the incentives arising from the tournament are decreasing in
the number of individuals competing for a particular vacancy. For this reason, the ﬁrm may want to
reduce the probability that a management vacancy is given to an individual from the external labor
market in order to sustain a suﬃciently high level of productivity in the ﬁrm. This can be done by
reducing η. The extreme case where η =0corresponds to a situation where the ﬁrm has ports of entry,
see Doeringer and Piore (1971). This may not be optimal, however, because employees who know the
competition may collude to shirk. Hence, to break any attempts of collusion the hiring from outside
is potentially fruitful, see Chan (1996). These considerations determine the values of ηH and ηL.8 In
t h ef o l l o w i n g ,w ea s s u m et h a tη is chosen optimally ex-ante by the ﬁrm.9
The implications of the ﬁrm’s hiring strategy on the ﬂows in the labor market are illustrated in
Figure 1. In the case where the ﬁrm does not have ports of entry, individuals in the external labor
market are hired into both the non-management and management levels. If a person is hired into non-
management, he or she may have the opportunity to move into management. All workers employed
by the ﬁrm have an exogenous separation risk, hence there are ﬂows from all hierarchal levels in the
ﬁrm and back into the external labor market. In the case where the ﬁrm has ports of entry, all ﬂows
from the external labor market are into the non-management sector. This implies that the only way
a person gets a job in management is by accepting a job in non-management and subsequently being
promoted into management. As before separations take place from both sectors.
7The matching function gives the number of job matches that take place at each point in time. Thus it is the analogous
of the production function but "inputs" are vacancies and job seekers. For more details on the matching function, the
reader is referred to Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) and Pissarides (2000).
8An additional important point is that tournament games give incentives to sabotage and undermine team eﬀort as
shown in Lazear (1989). In industries where team work is important (and sabotage is potentially costly), tournament
games can be counterproductive. Thus, when modeling incentives in such industries, competition among employees
should be modeled explicitly.
9Since low and high skilled workers are imperfect substitutes in management there are two tournaments in the ﬁrm,
i.e. one for the low skilled and one for the high skilled. This implies that the employees competing for a management
vacancy have the same production capacity and hence they will exert the same level of eﬀort in equilibrium. In other
words, for given η0s each employee subgroup can be associated with a unique level of production.
6Figure 1: Flow diagrams.













Furthermore, let qH be the probability that a H-job meets a H-worker in any time period. Similarly,
if qNM is the probability that a non-management job is matched to a worker and qLM is the probability























In addition, let pH be the probability that a H-worker encounters a H-job in any time period, pNM
is the rate at which a worker meets a non-management job and pLM i st h er a t ea tw h i c haw o r k e r
10See for instance Pissarides (2000).













From this it follows that pHM(θH)=θHqHM(θH),p NM(θNM)=θNMqNM(θNM) and pLM(θL)=
θLqLM(θL).
2.1 Payoﬀs functions and wage determination
In the model, a match is created every time a ﬁrm and a worker meet and agree to an employment
contract. In this process, the ﬁrm maximizes proﬁts and the individual maximizes the present dis-
counted value (PDV) of the expected income stream. For the ﬁrm to maximize proﬁts it is faced
with two questions. First, it has to make a decision on whether to open a vacancy or not. Second, it
should maximize the PDV of the expected proﬁt from recruiting a particular worker. For the individual
the decision is to assess if the job oﬀered is the most attractive given the alternative options such as
other employment or continued job search. In addition, an important part of the job creation process
is wages determination. A consequence of the job search process is that employment matches entail
rent.11 This rent is, following the convention, assumed to be split between the ﬁrm and the worker
according to a Nash bargaining rule. Hence, a proportion of the value of the match is allocated to the
ﬁrm and the rest is given to the worker in terms of wages. In the following, we are explicit about how
these processes evolve.
2.1.1 The ﬁrm
The ﬁrm advertises three diﬀerent types of jobs. It is as if the ﬁrm owns three diﬀerent assets. It
maximizes the proﬁt from a vacant non-management job, a L-vacancy in the management sector and a
H-vacancy in the management sector. Furthermore, the ﬁrm potentially recruits two types of workers.
As outlined above, the productivity of the diﬀerent workers matched with the diﬀerent types of jobs
c a nb er a n k e da sf o l l o w s :yLNM <y HNM <y LM <y HM. Hence, in practice the ﬁrm is employing four
diﬀerent subtypes of workers each generating a diﬀerent proﬁt since they have separate productivities
and - as will be shown below - separate costs.
Let’s denote the expected PDV of having a vacant non-management job by VNM. The expected
PDV of having a ﬁlled non-management job, however, depends on the productivity of the worker. For
this reason, it is important to distinguish between expected PDV of having a non-management job
ﬁlled by a low-skilled worker, JLNM, and the expected PDV of having a non-management job ﬁlled by
a high-skilled worker, JHNM.
In a perfect capital market, the valuation of a vacant non-management job is such that the capital
cost rVNM (where r is the discount rate) equals the rate of return on the asset. Recalling that the job
is ﬁlled by a high-skilled or a low-skilled worker with probability qNM, then the rate of return on the
11The rent is a consequence of the friction imposed by the matching technology.
8asset can be written as the diﬀerence between the cost of the vacant non-management job, cNM, and
the expected average return generated by having the job ﬁlled by a worker of any type. The average
return of having a low-skilled or a high-skilled worker in the job is equal to the sum of the returns
generated by low-skilled workers and the returns generated by high-skilled workers, weighted by the








Using the same intuition, the valuation of a non-management job ﬁlled by a low-skilled worker can
b ew r i t t e ns u c ht h a tt h ec a p i t a lc o s trJLNM equals the return on the asset. In this case, the net return
on the asset is equal to the output produced by a low-skilled worker in a non-management job minus
the cost of ﬁlling the job, wLNM, which is the wage paid to the worker. In addition to this, the eventual
loss of revenues that occur if the worker and the ﬁrm separate, which happens with probability s, and
the potential loss if the worker ﬁnds a job in the management sector must be added. This amounts
to12
rJLNM = yLNM − wLNM + s(VNM − JLNM)+pLM(VNM − JLNM). (2)
Similarly, the asset value of hiring a high-skilled worker to a non-management job, JHNM, is
rJHNM = yHNM − wHNM + s(VNM − JHNM)+pHM(VNM − JHNM), (3)
where wHNM is the wage earned by a high-skilled worker in non-management.
We can now derive the remaining expected PDVs of the ﬁrm’s assets in the same way. The expected
income streams of having a L- or H- vacancy, VLM,V HM, are
rVLM = qLM(JLM − VLM) − cLM, (4)
and
rVHM = qHM(JHM − VHM) − cHM, (5)
where cLM and cHM are the vacancy costs for L- and H-vacancies respectively.
Finally, the expected proﬁt from recruiting a low-skilled worker to a management job, JLM is given
by
rJLM = yLM − wLM + s(VLM − JLM), (6)
and the value to the ﬁrm of having a management job ﬁlled by a high-skilled worker, JHM is
rJHM = yHM − wHM + s(VHM − JHM), (7)
where wHM and wLM are the wages for high- and low-skilled workers in management.
12Note that in the special case where the ﬁrm has perfect ports of entry i.e. ηL = ηH =0then PLM and PHM are
independent of eL and eH.
92.1.2 The worker
In the following, the returns to the worker will be derived. A low-skilled worker who is not employed
by the ﬁrm will search for a job in both the management and non-management sectors. In contrast,
if the low-skilled worker is already employed in the non-management sector, he or she will only search
for jobs in management. When employed in non-management, the worker will earn wLNM and given
employment in management the wage is wLM. For simplicity we assume that the income the worker
would get when unemployed, i.e. unemployment insurance beneﬁts, is set to zero.
Let EL be the present discounted value of the expected income stream of a low-skilled worker not
employed by the ﬁrm. In unit time, the individual may move either to a job in the non-management
sector or to a L-job in the management sector. The ﬁrst event occurs with probability pNM.T h e
worker would then earn the present discounted value of the expected income stream WLNM until he
ﬁnds a job in management or separates from the ﬁrm. If the individual instead gets a L-job in the
management sector (which occurs with probability pNM), he will earn the present discounted value of
the expected income stream WLM until a separation occurs. In summary, EL is equal to the expected
capital gain from a change of state or,
rEL = pNM(WLNM − EL)+pLM(WLM − EL). (8)
In a similar way, the asset value of being in the external labor market for a high-skilled worker, EH
can be determined as
rEH = pNM(WHNM − EH)+pHM(WHM − EH). (9)
The permanent income of a low-skilled worker employed in non-management WLNM is given by
the wage, wLNM, the risk premium against unemployment and the option value of getting a job in
management
rWLNM = wLNM + s(EL − WLNM)+pLM(WLM − WLNM), (10)
where WLM is the expected income stream earned by a low-skilled employee in a management job.
Employees already working in management do not search for a new job, but they face the separation
probability s. Thus, the permanent income of a low-skilled individual employed in management is
rWLM = wLM + s(EL − WLM). (11)
In a similar way, we can derive the permanent income of high-skilled individuals employed in a
non-management job, WHNM, and a management job, WHM, as follows
rWHNM = wHNM + s(EH − WHNM)+pHM(WHM − WHNM), (12)
rWHM = wHM + s(EH − WHM). (13)
2.1.3 Wages determination
The ﬁnal step is to derive an expression for wages. Following the convention in the literature, the ﬁrm
and the worker negotiate about the wage using a Nash bargaining rule. Furthermore, it is assumed
that a worker negotiating with a potential employer cannot simultaneously bargain for another job. In
addition, the employer observes the skill of the worker when they start the bargaining.13
13Here we assume that bargaining fails at the same rate as jobs are destroyed, Gautier (2002).
10The disagreement payoﬀ, DLNM, for low-skilled workers in the external labor force bargaining for
the wage in non-management satisﬁes the asset equation14
rDLNM = s(EL − DLNM)+pLM(WLM − DLNM). (14)
In words, the present discounted value of the expected disagreement payoﬀ of a low-skilled worker
who is not employed by the ﬁrm is equal to the PDV the individual would expect to get from bargaining
with the ﬁrm and simultaneously continue searching for a job in the management sector. If the
negociation fails (with probability s) he goes back to the external labor market and earns EL.I f
the ﬁrm and the worker do not disagree or if the worker does not ﬁnd a job in management (with
probability pLM), the bargaining goes on and the worker earns the payoﬀs of a non-management job.
The remaining disagreement payoﬀs are derived in the same way. DHNM is the disagreement payoﬀ
for external high-skilled workers bargaining for non-management wages, and DLM and DHM are the
payoﬀs for low- and high-skilled workers employed in a non-management job. They satisfy
rDLM = s(EL − DLM), (15)
rDHNM = s(EH − DHNM)+pHM(WHM − DHNM), (16)
rDHM = s(EH − DHM). (17)
Finally, the value of the match (W − D)+(J − V ) is shared between the worker and the ﬁrm using
the Nash bargaining rule, see Bimore et al. (1986).15 This requires that the proportion β of the match
value goes to the ﬁrm and the remaining part is given to the worker. Hence, the following expressions
will be satisﬁed
(1 − β)(WLNM − DLNM)=β(JLNM − VNM), (18)
(1 − β)(WHNM − DHNM)=β(JHNM − VNM), (19)
(1 − β)(WLM − DLM)=β(JLM − VLM), (20)
(1 − β)(WHM − DHM)=β(JHM − VHM). (21)
2.2 Equilibrium
The steady state equilibrium is characterized by two restrictions. First, the labor market ﬂows are
stable. Second, all proﬁt opportunities in the market are exhausted. An immediate consequence
of focusing on the steady state is that all the ﬂows related to the ﬁrm such as transitions from the
external labor market and into the ﬁrm, reallocations within the ﬁrm, and separations can be described.
Given these ﬂows are stable, the structure of the ﬁrm and the composition of the workforce can be
determined. This involves characterizing the proportion of the employees working in management and
non-management as well as identifying the skill composition in both sectors. Finally, the wages for
each employee subgroup are derived. Combining this information with knowledge about the workforce
composition, the wage structure in the ﬁrm can be determined.
14Employees leave their current job when bargaining for a new job.
15Previously, this apporach has been used by Diamond (1982), Mortensen (1982) and Pissarides (1987).
112.2.1 Steady state ﬂows and the employment composition
The ﬁrst steady state condition equates the ﬂow of low-skilled employees into non-management to the
ﬂows out of that state
pNMeL =( s + pLM)iLNM. (22)
That is, the number of low-skilled in the external labor market who are successful in ﬁnding non-
management jobs equals the number of individuals leaving that state either for a job in management
or due to a separation from the ﬁrm. A similar equation can be derived for high-skilled workers in
non-management
pNMeH =( s + pHM)iHNM. (23)
An additional steady state condition which has to be satisﬁed is that the ﬂows of low-skilled workers
into and out of management are equal
pLM(ηLeL + iLNM)=siLM. (24)
Finally, the fourth steady state condition equates the ﬂows into and out of management for high-
skilled workers
pHM(ηHeH + iHNM)=siHM. (25)
Important to note is that in a ﬁrm with perfect ports of entry (ηL = ηH =0 )individuals in the
external labor market are restrained from getting management jobs, hence equations (24) and (25) are
reduced to16
˜ pLMiLNM = siLM
and
˜ pHMiHNM = siHM.
Thus, as expected the ﬁrm’s hiring policy has implications for the steady state ﬂows and as will be
seen below also for the equilibrium composition of the employees.
Recalling that the proportion of low-skilled in the labor market is denoted by π, i.e.
iLNM + iLM + eL = π,
iHNM + iHM + eH =1 − π,
16The ~’s are used to denote that the probabilities are altered together with η.
12the steady state employee composition can be derived from the equations (22) to (25)
iLNM =
spNMπ
(pLM + s)(pNM + ηLpLM + s)
, (26)
iLM =
pLMπ[pNM + ηL(pLM + s)]








(pHM + s)(pNM + s + ηHpHM)
, (29)
iHM =
pHM(1 − π)[pNM + ηH(pHM + s)]




pNM + s + ηHpHM
. (31)
From the steady state proportions it follows that the composition of low- and high-skilled employees
in the ﬁrm reﬂects the composition in the labor market, i.e. the proportion of low-skilled employees in
both non-management and management increase in π.
2.2.2 The wage structure
Wages are determined by the ﬁrm’s incentives to maximize proﬁts and the individual’s desire to in-
crease the present discounted value of the expected income stream that can be obtained from working.
Furthermore, in equilibrium all proﬁt opportunities from new jobs are exploited and driven to zero by
free entry. In other words, we have VNM = VLNM + VHNM =0and VLM = VHM =0 . From this, the
following equilibrium condition can be derived
JLNM =
yLNM − wLNM














These equations state that in equilibrium the proﬁts from an occupied job are equal to the diﬀer-
ence between the worker’s productivity and his wage divided by the ﬁrm’s implicit discount rate17.
Furthermore, we have that
WLNM − DLNM =
wLNM
r + s + pLM
,
WHNM − DHNM =
wHNM
r + s + pHM
,








17The ﬁrm’s implicit discount rate when the worker is employed in a management job is equal to the sum of the
discount rate plus the separation rate. When the worker is employed in a non-management job, the ﬁrm also takes into
account the fact that the worker is searching for a management job.
13Using the Nash bargaining rule, the notation
yLNM = y, yHNM = µ1y, yLM = µ2y and yHM = µ3y where µj > 1 , j =1 ,2,3 (36)
and
κ0 = iLM/(iLNM + iHNM + iLM + iHM),κ 1 = iHM/(iLNM + iHNM + iLM + iHM),
κ2 = iLNM/(iLNM + iHNM + iLM + iHM), and κ3 = iHNM/(iLNM + iHNM + iLM + iHM),
the following proposition regarding the wage structure in the ﬁrm can be stated
Proposition 1 Under the equilibrium conditions:
a) Wages are proportional to productivity i.e. wj = βyj , j ∈ {LNM,HNM,LM,HM}
b) The distribution of wages in the ﬁrm is
w =

    
    
wLNM with Probability κ0
wHNM with Probability κ1
wLM with Probability κ2
wHM with Probability κ3
with mean
E(w)=κ0wLNM + κ1wHNM + κ2wLM + κ3wHM
= yβ(κ0 + κ1µ1 + κ2µ2 + κ3µ3),
and variance
Va r(w)=E(w2) − E(w)2
= Va r(κ0,κ 1,κ 2,κ 3,µ 1,µ 2,µ 3,y,β).
The parameters of Proposition (1) will be estimated in the empirical section of the paper.
2.3 Discussion
The wage distribution has previously been analyzed by Juhn et al. (1993) and Katz and Autor (1999).
It has been convention in these studies to decompose the wage dispersion into a part reﬂecting between
(educational) group wage diﬀerentials and a residual part capturing the within (educational) group
wage diﬀerentials.18 The decomposition proposed above is more detailed than convention because it
18The breakdown of the wage dispersion may be even more detailed in terms of the observable demographic charac-
teristics, see Katz and Autor (1999) for a survey.
14treats the wage diﬀerentials between management and non-management employees explicitly. However,
in order to make our discussion of the wage structure comparable with the previous research in the
area the following deﬁnitions are made. First, the wage diﬀerential of employees with diﬀerent levels of
education who are working in the same type of job will be denoted as the between group wage inequality.
Second, the wage diﬀerential of employees with the same level of education who are working in diﬀerent
jobs is referred to as the within (educational) group wage inequality. These deﬁnitions are summarized
in Lemma (1)
Lemma 1 Under the equilibrium conditions:


































Furthermore, as information on the employee allocation to jobs within the ﬁrm is unavailable in
conventional labor market studies, it is interesting also to provide a decomposition of wage dispersion
which does not require this information. Lets deﬁne "the return to education" as the wage diﬀerential
between high- and low-skilled employees in the ﬁrm and for the sake of completeness lets deﬁne "the
return to management" as the wage diﬀerential between management and non-management employees.
These deﬁnitions are summarized in Lemma (2)
Lemma 2 Under the equilibrium conditions:









where ψ0 = iLNM/(iLNM + iHNM),ψ 1 = iHNM/(iLNM + iHNM),ψ 2 = iLM/(iLM + iHM) and
ψ3 = iHM/(iLM + iHM),









Lemma (2) combines the parameters {µ1,µ 2,µ 3} with the steady state proportions derived in
equations (26) to (31). Thus, the returns to education and the returns to management are shown to
be functions of the underlying within and between wage inequality measures. This observation carries
an important message because it shows that the measures used to decompose the wage distribution
in conventional labor market studies are aﬀected by the structure of the ﬁrm, i.e. the relative size of
the management sector and wage diﬀerentials between management and non-management employees.
This suggests that information on within ﬁrm job assignment is important in order to understand the
structure of wages. Furthermore, Lemma (1) can be used to identify the underlying driving forces
behind the changes in the more aggregate measures (such as the returns to education) that are applied
in conventional studies of wage inequality.
The results obtained in Proposition (1), Lemma (1) and Lemma (2) are discussed further below.
2.3.1 Technological progress
Proposition (1) establishes a close relation between productivity and wages. This implies that technol-
ogy shocks changing the productivity of the workers will have consequences for wages and potentially
for wage inequality. First, technological progress increasing the common productivity level, y, will
increase the average wage level in the ﬁrm, i.e. ∂E(w)/∂y > 0. Furthermore, it will increase wage
dispersion. The intuition is that the wage for the group of low-skilled non-management employees is
increased by β∆y whereas the wages for the remaining employee subgroups are increased by βµj∆y
, j =1 ,2,3 where µj > 1. Hence, simultaneously with the right shift in the wage distribution it
becomes more right-skewed. Second, positive shocks to the relative productivity (such as skill-biased
technological change) of the diﬀerent employee subgroups increases the wage level, i.e. ∂E(w)/∂µj > 0
,j=1 ,2,3. A change in the relative productivity of the employees will in general have ambiguous
eﬀects on wage dispersion. Simulations around the observed equilibrium for the ﬁrm studied in this
paper show, however, that an increase in any of the parameters {µ1,µ 2,µ 3} will increase the wage
dispersion. These results are summarized in Lemma (3)
Lemma 3 Technological progress increases the wage level and the wage dispersion in the ﬁrm.
Skill-biased technological progress increases the wage level in the ﬁrm, but in general it has an
ambiguous eﬀect on wage dispersion.
Lemma (1) describes the within and between groups wage diﬀerentials. These measures are not
altered by skill-neutral technology shocks as the common productivity component nets out. In con-
trast, they are aﬀected by changes in the relative productivity. Hence, they respond to skill-biased
technological change.
Finally, as Lemma (2) is constructed from the parameters {µ1,µ 2,µ 3} and the steady state em-
ployment compositions, it is unaﬀected by skill neutral technological change as long as the structure of
16employment does not respond to changes in technology.19 Skill-biased technological change, however,
aﬀects the measures. In particular, an increase in the relative productivity of high-skilled management
employees (µ3 %) has a positive eﬀect on the returns to education.
The empirical literature has documented that the recent increase in wage inequality is driven partly
by a widening of the wage diﬀerentials between high- and low-skilled workers and partly by an increase
in wage dispersion within narrowly deﬁned educational groups, see the survey in Katz and Autor
(1999). These ﬁndings provide a test for the model as they can be used to evaluate its ability to
replicate the empirically observed dynamics.
L e t sf o c u so na ni n c r e a s ei nt h er e l a t i v ep r o d u c t i vity of high-skilled management employees caused
by a skill-biased technological shock (µ3 %). From Lemma (1) the shock can be seen to increase the
relative wage gap between high- and low-skilled employees in management and to increase the wage
dispersion within the group of high-skilled employees. Furthermore, as argued above, the change in
relative productivity will increase the returns to education. Thus, a skill-biased shock to the produc-
tivity of high-skilled employees in management is capable of producing the wage dynamics observed in
the labor market. Below, we show that this line of reasoning has empirical relevance.
2.3.2 Estimation procedure
The measures of wage inequality deﬁned above are crucial for the subsequent analysis because they
form the basis for obtaining empirical estimates of the model’s parameters. In particular, there is a
close link between the Mincer wage equation and the measures deﬁned in Lemma (1).





tδ +  t
Where ξ(.) is an indicator function, X is a set of explanatory variables,   is an error term and δ is
a set of parameters.20
The point estimates obtained from the regression can be used to predict the expected log-wages for
the diﬀerent employee subgroups. For instance, ln ˆ wLNM =ˆ α + X0





ln ˆ wHNM − ln ˆ wLNM =ˆ α +ˆ µ
∗
1 + X0
tˆ δ − ˆ α + X0
tˆ δ =ˆ µ
∗
1 (37)
Recall from Lemma (1) that,
ˆ wHNM
ˆ wLNM





=l nµ1 ⇔ ln ˆ wHNM − ln ˆ wLNM =l nµ1 (38)
hence, combining equations (37) and (38) we get
ˆ µ
∗
1 =l nµ1 ⇔ µ1 =e x p ( ˆ µ
∗
1)
Similar links between the parameters of the theoretical model and the parameters estimated by the
Mincer equation can be made.
19We elaborate on this issue below.
20The regression is constructed such that the low-skilled employees in non-management constitute the reference group,







are with respect to this group only. Wage
diﬀerentials between other employee subgroups not involving the low-skilled non-management employees can be obtained
by combining the parameters appropriately, see Lemma (1).
17In the empirical analysis conducted below various versions of the Mincer wage regression will be
used.
3T h e D a t a
Seven years of monthly personnel records from the main production size of an international pharma-
ceutical company are used in the empirical analysis. The average employment in the plant over the
period 1997 to 2003 is 6175 persons, and the share of management workers in the ﬁrm is close to 4.5
percent in all years.21 Empirically, the ﬁrm is close to having ports of entry since 99 percent of all
workers are hired into non-management.22 For the individual worker, the promotion probability is
almost 2 percent a year and the separation rate from the ﬁrm is 3.52 percent on average.
The full data set consists of 519,016 observations. These data contain information about the
employee’s age, gender, tenure, educational level, job assignment and wages. The observations with
missing information (mainly caused by lacking information on education) are deleted which leaves us
with a sample of 487,514 observations. This is the sample used in the analysis below.







Gender (woman = 1)  0.550 
 
Education (high-skilled = 1)  0.348 
 
# observations  487,514 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics, 1997-2003.
The descriptive statistics for the monthly employee-based observations used in the analysis are
presented in Table 1. The ﬁrm employs 55.01 percent women and the average employee is 39.53 years
old. These individuals have 7.80 years of tenure on average. The ﬁrm is operating in a segment where
product development is crucial for survival. This implies that a large proportion of the employees are
engaged directly in research. In addition, the production process is highly automated, and in order
to meet the strict requirements of the FDA (Food and Drug Administration) product testing is an
21Only permanent full-time employment is considered in this analysis which corresponds to 91.76 percent of the
individuals employed at the workplace. In addition, the executive management (CEO, executive vice presidents and
senior vice presidents) is excluded due to lack of information on the compensation package for these individuals. For
recent surveys on executive compensation, see Murphy (1999) and Hall and Murphy (2003).
22Doeringer and Piore (1971) argued that the presence of ports of entry and exit are crucial for the existence and
sustainability of an internal labor market. This result, however, was questioned in the seminal work by Baker et al.
(1994a,b) who found no evidence for ports of entry and exit in the ﬁrm they studied. Nevertheless, they argue that there
was clear evidence that an internal labor market was at work. Our ﬁrm seems to be more in line with the ﬁrms studied
by Doeringer and Piore.
18essential part of production. This structure explains the high education level in the ﬁrm where 34.80
percent of the ﬁrm’s employees have a bachelor degree or above. In the sequel, we term individuals
with education levels below a bachelor degree as low-skilled and the remaining part as high-skilled.
A preliminary look at the real wage structure in the ﬁrm shows some interesting features. In
Table 2, the yearly average wages for the four groups: low-skilled non-management, high-skilled non-
management, low-skilled management and high-skilled management are presented. As expected, the
wage level increases with education level and rank. Furthermore, it can be seen that all four groups
experience real wage growth over the 7-year period, however, the growth rates diﬀer substantially across
groups. Most pronounced is the wage growth for low-skilled employees in management who have a
wage increase of 25.39 percent. In contrast, the real wage increase for low-skilled in non-management
is only 3.92 percent. Similar tendencies can be seen for high-skilled individuals. Thus, the wage gap
between management and non-management employees increased signiﬁcantly over the period.
   Employee subgroup 
 


































































      
Real wage growth 
1997-2003 
3.92% 3.63%  25.39%  10.04% 
      
# observations  316,614  149,554  1,227  20,119 
 
Tabel 2: Real wages, 1997-2003.
4 Developments in Wage Inequality
In this section, the wage inequality in the ﬁrm is analyzed empirically and the parameters of Propo-
sition (1) are estimated. A ﬁrst step in the analysis is to determine that the observed general and
relative changes in productivity and hence in wages have signiﬁcant (sizeable) consequences for the
wage structure in the ﬁrm. Secondly, an econometric model that accommodates the changes over time
is estimated and point estimates of {µ∗
1,µ ∗
2,µ ∗
3,y} are obtained. This exercise pines down the magnitude
by which the overall and relative productivity and wages change over the period 1997 to 2003. Hence
the underlying mechanisms driving the changes in the wage structure are identiﬁed. Finally, Lemma
19(1) and Lemma (2) are used to relate the ﬁndings to the existing empirical literature. We observe
patterns in the data similar to those observed in other recent studies of wage inequality and conclude
that the increase in wage dispersion is explained by ampliﬁed within and between educational group
wage inequality which is driven by a widening in the gap between management and non-management
wages.
Proposition (1) proposed a decomposition of the overall wage diﬀerential into four education-rank
categories: low-skilled non-management, high-skilled non-management, low-skilled management and
high-skilled management. Using Mincer wage equations, the wage diﬀerentials between these employee
subgroups can be estimated and point estimates of the parameters of Proposition (1) are obtained
from this regression. The results are presented in Table 3. In the ﬁrst model where only the skill-rank
categories are included the wage diﬀerential between low- and high-skilled non-management workers
(µ∗
1) is estimated to 32.1 percent. The wage gaps between low-skilled non-management workers and
low- and high-skilled management workers (µ∗
2 and µ∗
3) are estimated to 55.6 percent and 78.8 percent,
respectively. Adding further information to the model, i.e. including time dummies and demographic
and tenure variables, reduces the wage gains from management slightly reﬂecting that these workers
in general are older and have longer tenure than non-management workers. Overall the results have
changed only marginally and the highly signiﬁcant wage diﬀerentials across the four groups persist.23
   (1)
  (2)
  (3) 
Low-skilled in  
Non-management 
 


































      
Demographic and 
tenure variables 
NO NO  YES 
Time dummies  NO  YES  YES 
      
R-squared 0.326  0.327  0.398 
# observations  487,514  487,514  487,514 
Note: Standard errors are clustered with respect to individuals. The demographic and tenure variables used 
in the regression are: gender, age, age squared, tenure and tenure squared.  
Table 3: Mincer wage equations.
The models presented in Table 3 estimate the average wage diﬀerentials between the diﬀerent
23The explanatory power of the model increases from 32.6 percent to 39.8 percent when information on time, de-
mographics and tenure is included in the model. The explanatory power is high compared to standard Mincer wage
equations estimated on traditional labor market data sets. However, compared to the study by Baker et al.(1994a,b)
who explain 70 percent of the cross-sectional wage variation in the ﬁrm using only the hierarchical level of the ﬁrm our
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Figure 2: Wage distributions for 1997 and 2003.
employee subgroups for the period 1997 to 2003. The regressions accommodate that the wage level
may be time-varying (time dummies are included), but they restrict the relative wages to be time-
invariant. This restriction, however, is rejected by the data given the evidence presented in Table 2
where the relative wages are documented to vary substantially over time.
In order to assess the importance of the changes in the relative wages for the wage structure, a
model similar to model 3 in Table 3 is estimated for the two years 1997 and 2003. The point estimates
from these regressions are used together with the characteristics of the workforce in 1997 to predict
the wages for the two years.24 This reveals that the standard deviation of the predicted log-wages
increases from 0.217 to 0.245 over the period. A result that is expressed visually in Figure 2 where
kernels for the two predicted distributions are presented. This documents that the wage structure is
aﬀected signiﬁcantly by the changes in relative wages.
To fully accommodate the shifts in the parameters, we estimate a model that allows for overall wage
change and shifts in the relative wages over time. In practice, a model where dummies for belonging to
a particular employee subgroup, time dummies and interaction terms between employee subgroup and
t h et i m ed u m m i e sa r ee s t i m a t e d .T h er e s u l t so ft his estimation are presented in Figures 3 and 4.25
Figure 3 shows the changes in the real wage level from 1997 to 2003. The real wages increase for all
employee subgroups from 1997 and up to 2001. In the context of the model, this shows that the overall
productivity captured by the variable y increases in this period. The period of growth is followed by
two years of decline such that the general wage level in 2003 is at the same level as in 2000.26 Over
24The 1997 workforce characteristics are used in both predictions to avoid employee composition eﬀects.
25The full regression results are presented in the appendix.
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Figure 3: General wage increase, 1997-2003.
the full period, the general real wage level increases by 1.69 percent.
In Figure 4, the development in relative wages for the period 1997 to 2003 is presented. The
relative wages between high- and low-skilled employees in non-management have increased by 1.51
percent. This change is small, however, compared to the increased wage gap between non-management
and management workers. The wage diﬀerential between high-skilled in management and low-skilled
in non-management is altered by 8.70 percent and the increase in the wage gap between low-skilled
in management and non-management is as high as 22.54 percent. These observations clearly indicate
that the technology shocks hitting the ﬁrm in the period enhance the productivity of management
employees relatively more than the productivity of non-management employees.
Thus, skill-neutral technology shocks changing y and skill-biased technological shocks altering the
parameters {µ1,µ 2,µ 3} increase the overall and relative wage levels resulting in a signiﬁcant increase
in wage dispersion in the ﬁrm over the period 1997 to 2003. These ﬁndings can be related to previous
empirical ﬁndings through Lemma (1) and Lemma (2) where the focus is on the within and between
educational group measures of wage inequality, see Juhn et al. (1993) and Katz and Author (1999).









Figure 4: Development in relative wages, 1997-2003.
   Model (1)
  Model (2)
  Model (3)
  Model (4)
 
Constant  9.023 (0.090)  9.029 (0.089)  9.090 (0.089)  9.096 (0.088) 
Low  skilled  - - - - 
High skilled (HS)  0.372 (0.006)  0.358 (0.007)  0.326 (0.006)  0.317 (0.006) 
Non-management     -  - 
Management (M)      0.395 (0.010)  0.344 (0.013) 
      
HS*1998   0.009  (0.003)  0.003  (0.003) 
HS*1999   0.013  (0.004)  0.010  (0.005) 
HS*2000   0.023  (0.005)  0.019  (0.005) 
HS*2001   0.025  (0.006)  0.021  (0.006) 
HS*2002    0.002 (0.013)    -0.004 (0.014) 
HS*2003   0.020  (0.009)  0.013  (0.009) 
M*1998       0.038  (0.007) 
M*1999       0.018  (0.011) 
M*2000       0.028  (0.013) 
M*2001       0.064  (0.015) 
M*2002       0.091  (0.019) 
M*2003       0.080  (0.016) 
      
Demographic and 
tenure variables 
YES YES YES YES 
Year  dummies  YES YES YES YES 
      
R-squared  0.351 0.351 0.398 0.399 
#  observations  487,514 487,514 487,514 487,514 
Note: Standard errors are clustered with respect to individuals. 
Table 4: Mincer wage equations.
The returns to education measure presented in Lemma (2) are constructed such that it reﬂects the
measure of between group wage inequality, used in conventional labor market studies of wage inequality
23i.e. it ignores information on job assignment within the ﬁrm. Using the Mincer wage equation, the
return to education, captured by an indicator for high skills, is estimated to 37.2 percent, see model
1 of Table 4. This estimate represents the average return to education over the period 1997 to 2003.
Model 2 goes into more detail by studying the change over time. This is done by adding interaction
terms between being high-skilled and the time dummies. The results show that the return to education
has increased from 35.8 percent in 1997 to 37.8 in 2003 - an increase of 2 percent. Hence the between
group wage inequality clearly increased in this period.
The 2 percent increase in the return to education is remarkable given the results obtained above.
The reason is that the return to education in non-management increases by only 1.51 percent and
the return to education in management is reduced by 13.90 percent over the same period.27 Hence,
the overall increase in the returns to education cannot be explained by the development in the wage
diﬀerentials within the hierarchal levels. Instead, the focus should be on the divergences in wages
between hierarchal levels.
In model 3, the return to education is estimated simultaneously with the returns to management.
Compared with model 1, there is a reduction in the returns to education of 4.6 percent which indicates
that a substantial part of the wage diﬀerential contributed to diﬀerences in the level of education in
model 1 reﬂects wage diﬀerentials between non-management and management employees. Furthermore,
the explanatory power of the model is increased by 4.7 percentage points emphasizing the importance
of including information about the hierarchal level into the wage regression.
The interesting result is presented in model 4 where the time development in both the return to
education and the return to management are estimated. In this regression, the increase in the return
to education is 1.3 percent (and insigniﬁcant) as opposed to the estimated increase in model 2 of 2
percent. In contrast to these low numbers, the increase in the return to management is as high as
8 percent over the period. This clearly shows that part of the estimated increase in the returns to
education in model 2 is driven by a divergence of wages between management and non-management.
To sum up, the results presented above show that both the between and within group wage inequality
have increased over the period, i.e. the wage gap between high- and low-skilled employees has widened
and the wage gaps between management and non-management for similar educational groups have
increased. Furthermore, it is established that these changes are driven by a divergence in the wage
levels of management and non-management employees. This allows us to conclude that our ﬁndings
are in accordance with previous studies of wage inequality and that we have identiﬁed the substantial
changes in management compensation to be the main driving force behind the observed increase in
wage inequality.
5 Employment Responses and Wage Inequality
In the empirical section, it is documented that the ﬁrm experiences an increase in productivity (y %)
that leads to a wage growth of 1.69 percent. Furthermore, the diﬀerent employee subgroups experienced
speciﬁc productivity shocks resulting in diﬀerences in the relative wage growth, i.e. µ1,µ 2 and µ3
increased with diﬀerent rates in the period. The eﬀects of these shocks are not isolated to wage
27This result is obtained by realizing that the wage gap between high- and low-skilled workers in management is µ3/µ2
(see Lemma 1).
24responses. They also aﬀect the employment composition.28 This can be seen most clearly from the




















PNM(θNM)=g(y,µ1,µ 2,µ 3,Ω). (41)
where Ω is a set of parameters.
5.1 Technological change
Studying equations (39), (40) and (41), it is apparent that a technology shock (an increase in y)h a s
a positive eﬀect on PHM and PLM, i.e. ∂PHM/∂y > 0 and ∂PLM/∂y > 0. This eﬀect is coming from
a positive relation between the value of the employment match and the productivity of the employee.
Thus, the probability of getting a management job gets higher when the general productivity level
increases. The eﬀect of y on the probability of getting a non-management job is more involved. First,
the higher productivity increases the value of the match in non-management. Second, it becomes easier
for both the low- and high-skilled employees in non-management to be promoted into a management
job (due to the higher PHM and PLM). This has a negative eﬀect on the match value as the non-
management jobs will be dissolved at a faster rate. The net eﬀect is derived analytically in the appendix,
and it is established that the positive technology shock reduces the match value of non-management
jobs. Ultimately, this reduces the probability of getting jobs in non-management, ∂PNM/∂y < 0.
The change in the transition probabilities has implications for the steady state stocks of employees in
the internal and external labor markets. The probability of getting a job in management has increased,
hence the stock of managerial employees is higher in the new equilibrium. In the non-management
sector there are two eﬀects. First, the promotion probability has increased meaning that it has become
easier for the non-management employees to move into a management job. Second, it has become more
diﬃcult to get non-management jobs. These two eﬀects result in a reduction in the steady state stock
of non-management employees. Finally, the net eﬀect on the ﬂows into the ﬁrm is positive which results
in a reduction in the number of individuals remaining in the external labor market. The discussion is
summarized in Proposition (2).
Proposition 2 Technological progress increases employment in management, reduces employment in
non-management and lowers the stock of employees in the external labor market:
∂iLNM/∂y < 0,∂ i LHM/∂y < 0,∂ i LM/∂y > 0,∂ i HM/∂y > 0,∂ e L/∂y < 0,∂ e H/∂y < 0.
28At h i r de ﬀect not considered in this paper is how changes in labor market prices (such as relative wage changes
driven by technology shocks) aﬀect educational choice. In the context of the model this leads to changes in π. This issue
has recently been studied by Galor and Moav (2000) and Lee (2005)
29See the derivation in the appendix.
25Proposition (2) has some interesting implications. First, a ﬁrm that is hit by a positive productivity
shock will grow. Hence, more productive ﬁrms become relatively bigger in size. Second, a more
productive and hence relatively bigger ﬁrm will allocate relatively more employees to management
jobs. This is due to the higher probability of getting a management job for both internal and external
individuals and the reduced probability for the individuals in the external labor market to get a job in
non-management.
Corollary 1 Technological progress increases employment and makes the ﬁrm allocate relatively more
employees to management sector jobs.
Proposition (2) shows that technology progress increases the relative size of the management sector.
This result combined with the observation that management wages are higher than non-management
wages has the implication that the technology-driven employment responses will add to an increase
in wage dispersion. Thus, from Lemma (3) and Proposition (2) we can conclude that there are two
channels through which technological progress leads to increased wage dispersion. First, there is a
direct eﬀect on wages. Second, there is an eﬀect coming from the employment responses to the shock.
Corollary 2 Technological progress increases wage dispersion through a wage eﬀect and an employ-
ment eﬀect.
The comparative statistics presented above show that technological progress increases employment
and makes it optimal for the ﬁrm to allocate relatively more employees to management jobs. Since
these changes in the employment composition aﬀect the wage structure, they have to be accommodated
when analyzing changes in wage inequality.
6C o n c l u s i o n
Wage inequality has been rising since the mid-1970s. In this paper, we study the driving forces behind
the increased wage dispersion using a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous employees who
work in a ﬁrm with a management sector and a non-management sector. The parameters of the model
are estimated using seven years of personnel records from a large pharmaceutical company. The results
show that the ﬁrm experienced increased wage inequality over the period which is driven by ampliﬁed
between and within educational group wage inequality, i.e. the wage gaps between high- and low-skilled
employees has widened and the wage dispersion within educational groups has increased. Furthermore,
it is established that these changes are driven by a divergence in the wage levels of management and
non-management employees.
The results carry an important message as they show how information on within ﬁrm dynamics is
important for understanding changes in the wage distribution. In particular, we show an example of
how the development in wage inequality between educational groups can diﬀer across organizational
levels as inequality is documented to grow at the non-management level and to decline at the man-
agement level. Another important observation is that a large part of the within educational group
wage diﬀerential, which is normally treated as a regression residual, can be explained by employee
assignments to management and non-management jobs. These observations emphasize the importance
of integrating information about the ﬁrm structure into the analysis of wage inequality.
26The theoretical model presented in the paper has several innovations. First, it explicitly treats
all the ﬂows related to a ﬁrm i.e. transitions from the external labor market and into the ﬁrm (hir-
ings), reallocations within the ﬁrm (promotions) and separations. Second, the wage distribution is
constructed from a complete speciﬁcation of the employee composition in the ﬁrm and the diﬀerent
employee subgroup’s relative wages. Finally the model allows for studying the consequences of skill
neutral and skill biased technological change on the wage structure.
The main contribution of the paper, however, is the joint theoretical-empirical approach to analyzing
the driving forces behind the increased wage inequality. In this respect our paper is intended to
motivate future research using the same approach in order to advance our understanding of labor
market dynamics.
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7A p p e n d i x
7.1 Steady state conditions
The ﬁrst steady state condition equates the ﬂow of low-skilled workers into a non-management job to





Also, the ﬂows in and out of management for low-skilled workers have to be equal in the steady
state. In other words,
iLM =
pLM(s + ηpLM + pNM)
spNM
iLNM, (43)
where s is the separation rate. The third steady state equation equates the ﬂows into and out of




29Hence, the number of high-skilled workers in the external labor market who are successful in
ﬁnding non-management jobs will equal the number of individuals leaving that state either for a job







iLNM + iLM + eL = π
the following equations can be derived from (22) and (25)
π = iLNM + iLM + eL,
spNMπ = spNMiLNM + pLM(s + ηpLM + pNM)iLNM + s(s + pLM)iLNM,
iLNM =
spNMπ








(s + ηpLM + pNM)
. (48)
And in a similar fashion
eH =
s(1 − π)








(s + ηpHM + pNM)(s + pHM)
.
7.2 Closing the model
Applying the free entry condition rVHM = rVLM = rVNM =0and substituting (35) into (7), the










Assuming that the matching technology is Cobb-Douglas, i.e



































From (32), (33), (2) and (3) we have that
JLNM =
(1 − β)yLNM




r + s + pHM
.
So using (1) and setting θLNM = θ, one can derive
c = λ(θ)α−1(1−β)y
·
π(s + ηpHM + pNM)(s + r + pHM)+( 1− π)(s + ηpLM + pNM)(s + r + pLM)




By setting α =1 /2 and using the value of pLM and pHM obtained in (54) and (51), we get




θ(1 − β)y ˜ f(µ3)
c(r + s)d(πηλ







θ(1 − β)y ˘ f(µ2)
c(r + s)d(πηλ





d =( c(r + s)2 + λ












((1 − π)(λc(r + s)
√
θ + ηλ
2((1 − β)µ2,y)+sc(r + s))(c(r + s)2 + λ
2((1 − β)µ2,y))
i




c(r + s)yµ1(µ2 + µ3)˜ h(µ2)
(64
√
θ(c(r + s)2 +1 /8ηµ2,y)(c(r + s)2 +1 /8ηµ3,y)(8c(r + s)
√
θ +( 1− β)yη(µ2 + πµ3))2
+
c(r + s)y(µ2 + µ3)˘ h(µ3)
(64
√
θ(c(r + s)2 +1 /8ηµ2,y)(c(r + s)2 +1 /8ηµ3,y)(8c(r + s)
√
θ +( 1− β)yη(µ2 + πµ3))2
31where
˜ h(µ2)=8 c(r + s)2 + yηµ2)(32c2(r + s)2θ + yη(8c(r + s)(s +
√
θ)+ηµ2,y












θ(8c(r + s)2 + yηµ3)2˜ ρ(µ3)
(8c(r + s)2 + yηµ3)2(8c(r + s)2 + yηµ2)2(8c(r + s)
√
θ + yη(µ3 + µ2))2
+
8c2(r + s)2√
θµ1(8c(r + s)2 + yηµ2)2˘ ρ(µ2)
(8c(r + s)2 + yηµ3)2(8c(r + s)2 + yηµ2)2(8c(r + s)
√






2)+( yη(32c(r + s)2√
θ + ηy(2r +
√







3)+( yη(32c(r + s)2√
θ + ηy(2r +
√
θ))µ3)µ2 +2 ( r + s)y2η2µ2
2.
Hence, we see that
∂G
∂y























4(r + s)y2η2 ,
where
∆(µ2)=( 3 2 c(r + s)2√
θyη + η2y2(2r +
√























4(r + s)y2η2 ,
where
∆(µ3)=( 3 2 c(r + s)2√
θyη + η2y2(2r +
√





32If 64c2(r + s)3√
θ − y2η2µ2
i > 0 then the four roots are negative. It follows that
∂G
∂y
> 0 fo rall µi ∈ (1,+∞),i=2 ,3.
If 64c2(r + s)3√
θ − y2η2µ2





> 0 fo rall µi ∈ (1,µ 2
i),i=2 ,3.
In other words, using the implicit function theorem, we can solve (56) for θLNM and obtain
θLNM = f(α,π,c,λ,η,β,b,r,s,y).
7.3 Comparative statics








(ηpLM + s) −
∂pLM
∂y
sπpLNM(2ηpLM +2 ηs+ s).




















< 0 if 64c2(r + s)3√
θ − y2η2µ2
i > 0 and µi ∈ (1,+∞),i=2 ,3 or
∂θ
∂y
< 0 if 64c2(r + s)3√
θ − y2η2µ2
i < 0 and µi ∈ µi ∈ (1,µ 2
i),i=2 ,3 or












sπpLNM(2ηpLM +2 ηs+ s),
∂iLM/∂y =
















































then we get the signs given in Proposition (2).
337.4 Additional regressions
 Linear  regression
 
Constant 9.096  (0.088) 
Low-skilled in non- 
management (LNM) 
- 










HNM*1998 0.004  (0.003) 
HNM*1999 0.011  (0.005) 
HNM*2000 0.020  (0.006) 
HNM*2001 0.022  (0.006) 
HNM*2002 -0.003  (0.014) 
HNM*2003 0.015  (0.009) 
LM*1998 0.103  (0.024) 
LM*1999 0.091  (0.030) 
LM*2000 0.107  (0.053) 
LM*2001 0.182  (0.077) 
LM*2002 0.213  (0.083) 
LM*2003 0.225  (0.077) 
HM*1998 0.038  (0.007) 
HM*1999 0.024  (0.011) 
HM*2000 0.043  (0.013) 
HM*2001 0.079  (0.014) 
HM*2002 0.087  (0.015) 
HM*2003 0.102  (0.006) 
  
Demographic and tenure 
variables 
YES 
Year dummies  YES 
  
R-squared 0.400 
# observations  487,514 
 
Mincer wage regression.
34